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CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO:
ECONOMIC COSTS
Manh Dao, Cathy Geehan & Joshua Pandian
 In 2001, China achieved accession into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) after more 
than ten years of politically charged negotiations. 
The unusually long negotiation period was an in-
dicator of the controversy surrounding the issue, 
which remains heated to this day. Since China’s 
accession, economists and politicians around the 
world have been watching to monitor the out-
come after the five year phase-in period. While 
China’s economic gains have been significant, 
and the increase in exports dramatic, China’s ac-
cession to the WTO has had numerous negative 
effects.  Some of these negative effects are the 
adverse impacts on the environment, the dispar-
ity in wages between rural and urban citizens, the 
displacement of neighboring countries’ exports, 
and China’s increased skill in utilizing the WTO’s 
loopholes. 
 To best understand the implications, the 
WTO’s history and Chinese involvement should be 
reviewed. The WTO came into being as a result 
of various negotiations. Serving primarily as a me-
diator for consultations between member nations 
regarding world trade procedures and disputes, 
the WTO stems from the Uruguay Round, which 
spanned from 1986 to 1994. These negotiations 
were done under the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) and became the successor 
of the GATT in 1995. The WTO is composed of 153 
member states, with 30 serving as observers. The 
observers typically are states seeking permanent 
status. A common misconception about the WTO 
is that it expedites talks between countries and 
helps lower trade barriers to promote free trade. 
This is true; however it is not exclusively the work of 
the WTO. There are situations where certain bar-
riers remain in place to avoid exploitations that 
could directly affect consumers, such as when 
some loopholes allow corporations to forgo cer-
tain environmental regulations. Essentially, the 
purpose of the WTO is to allow the free flow of 
trade internationally, so long as the undesirable 
effects are minimized. The WTO emphasizes trans-
parency, enforceable agreements, reciprocity, 
safety valves and non-discrimination. Out of the 
five, non-discrimination is arguably the most es-
sential to the WTO.  This can be seen in its Most Fa-
vored Nation policies, which are designed to en-
sure that no one nation is favored above another 
so that free trade can be more easily facilitated. 
It is what makes WTO such a broad organization.
 The most notable thing that comes along 
with the magnificent increase in trade volume 
since 2001 is the deteriorating natural conditions 
for China. The pro-liberalization scholars have 
long reasoned that trade can be beneficial to the 
environment. One argument they make is that 
China could change its producing methods and 
technology to waste less resources and generate 
less pollution, and the government could raise 
the environmental standards. However, it is found 
that in China’s case, the sheer increase in scale 
far outweighs other effects. In order to produce 
more and take advantages of the opening mar-
kets, production in China has expanded rapidly, 
which means the amount of resources and the 
amount of waste have also increased exponen-
tially. 
 Under the WTO regime, the sectors of 
China’s economy that have grown the most are 
tha agriculture, aquaculture, textile, and  indus-
tries. China’s textile and apparel exports grew by 
more than 40 percent while its cotton consump-
tion expanded by 34 percent over the first three 
years of joining the WTO, and is still growing at a 
significant speed; its growth in 2010 was 10%. This 
industry has one of the largest ecological foot-
prints: it consumes a lot of water, and releases a 
lot of harmful chemicals as waste into the rivers 
and other water sources. In China, the technolo-
gy, although improved, is still inferior to that of the 
developed nations: “water consumption per unit 
of production is about 50 per cent higher than in 
developed countries … Dyes made in China usu-
ally have lower dye uptake and . . . dye residual in 
wastewater is higher … The sewer discharge per 
product is nearly double the amount discharged 
in developed countries.” (Jahiel, 317) 
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 Furthermore, a thorough modernizing pro-
gram is nearly impossible – as Jahiel states that the 
small firms are the primary producers of textile, ac-
counting for about 85% of all cotton textile manu-
facturers, and they have low access to financial 
sources and cutting-edge technology. The WTO 
helps worsen the situation in another way; the for-
eign direct investment (FDI) mostly flows to those 
small factories, because foreign investors simply 
want the profits these environment-harming fac-
tories can potentially make.
 To cope with the fast growth in manufac-
turing, the raw resource industries are also aug-
mented. China is already the world’s largest pro-
ducer and consumer of coal, the main resources 
used to produce electricity. And coal mining 
requires the demolition of mountains and land. 
“According to the 2005 China Environmental Re-
port, about five billion tons of soil are washed way 
annually in the region, one third of which comes 
from Shanxi, Shaanxi and IMAR” (the poor north-
western part of China) (Zhu, 14).  Not to mention 
the toxic water discharge and the farmland oc-
cupied or destroyed by coal mining. 
 The rise in volume and variety of trade 
caused by the WTO creates yet another problem: 
the introduction of exotic, potentially invasive, 
species around the world. Ecologists have found 
many marine creatures in the ballast water of the 
ships (the water stored in the bottom of a ship to 
keep it balance) and many insects in the pack-
ing crates, accidentally carried from China to the 
U.S and vice versa. With the similar climates, those 
species can easily establish and cause ecologi-
cal disasters. In 2000, it is calculated that it costs 
the U.S. around $137 billion per year to deal with 
the invasive species, and for China, it is $2.4 bil-
lion per year - only eight industries are calculated, 
which means the actual figure might be greater 
(Normile).
 Statistics show inequality in China also in-
creased at an alarming speed in the 2000s. The 
year 2009 marks the widest rural-urban income 
gap in China; the income ratio between the ur-
ban and rural population reached 3:33 to 1, and is 
predicted to keep rising (China Daily). During the 
high times of FDI inflows since China’s WTO’s ac-
cession, the urban areas and the industrial zones 
have attracted much attention, leaving the rural 
areas virtually untouched. While the impover-
ished people’s net income is shown to increase, 
it is nowhere near the amount earned by “the 
managers of State-owned enterprises, real estate 
developers and some private companies”. (Chi-
na Daily) Additionally, the percentage of rural en-
rollments in elite universities have shrunk from 50 
percent in the 1950s to 17.6 percent in 2000, and 
it is widely agreed by experts that the figure might 
be as low as 1 percent in 2010 (Newsweek). These 
trends actually already happened before the 
WTO’s membership; they are direct consequenc-
es of the rapid industrial growth, and especially 
the increase in FDI, as proved in Wan’s article. It 
is not prudent to say that the WTO is the cause 
of these problems. However, it helps open up the 
market and encourages the investors to come to 
China, so the WTO has its indirect responsibility in 
worsening the inequality issue in China.
 Not directly caused by the WTO’s acces-
sion, the notoriety of Chinese products originated 
from a period of rapid export production. The Chi-
nese government chose exports to be the focus of 
economic development after it joined the WTO. 
GDP growth was deemed more important than 
anything, and many quality controls are neglect-
ed.  In 2008, evidence that melamine, a chemical 
usually used in making plastics, was found in a Chi-
nese baby formula and shocked the entire world. 
It was further revealed that virtually all Chinese-
produced dairy products, including ordinary milk, 
ice cream, and yogurt also contained melamine. 
The structure of the dairy-processing chain is one 
of the factors that contributed to the poisoning of 
more than 290,000 people, and 6 deaths. Modern 
factories, the ones who received the FDI, still get 
raw materials from small, poor, uneducated fami-
lies who are desperate to make money. They can 
easily mix some melamine, which is very acces-
sible and cheap, to increase the nitrogen content 
– the protein level of the milk. The Chinese gov-
ernment, only focusing on production, neglects 
its role of inspection and quality controls (Xiu, 
467). Also, the news about lead in children’s toys 
imported from China made consumers around 
the world fear the astonishingly cheap products 
again, which they bought, due to the help of 
the WTO. In the long term, China’s product qual-
ity might be improved because the government 
wants to keep its reputation in the WTO, yet the 
problems are very pervasive and have roots in 
such basic stages that it will be very hard to fix 
them.
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 Due to China’s geographical size, its 
abundance of highly elastic, low-cost labor sup-
ply, and the overall liberalization of trade due to 
its accession into the WTO, it is uniquely equipped 
to attract foreign investment. China’s rapid 
growth has “triggered fears of increased compe-
tition for developing countries and hollowing out 
of manufacturing firms in advanced countries” 
(Greenaway, 153). First, developing countries that 
deal in similar exports, such as agricultural goods, 
textile products, and manufactured commodi-
ties, could see their export figures cannibalized 
by increased production of those goods in China. 
These countries are, for the most part, countries 
geographically close to China, such as Thailand 
and the Philippines. Because they are geographi-
cally close, their resources are similar, causing 
them to compete in similar sectors.  Due to China’s 
overwhelming influence in world trade, products 
from these smaller countries are often neglected 
for products of similar quality from China. It can 
be argued that, in the long run, importers would 
rather import from China because of China’s sta-
bility and the opportunity for trade from China’s 
other sectors. This would also open the door for 
future foreign direct investment in China from the 
importing nations. As a result, smaller neighbor-
ing countries can potentially be priced out of the 
market in the aforementioned sectors.
 Similarly, developed countries fear that 
the shift of Chinese industries from the primary 
sector to manufacturing will take away from their 
own exports. More developed nations in the Asian 
region such as Japan and South Korea have al-
ready shifted resources into high tech manufac-
turing sectors in anticipation of China’s growth, 
but China is starting to encroach on those sectors 
as well. With China’s resources and manpower, 
this poses a significant threat for the economies 
of those developed nations (Greenaway, 153). 
Essentially, developed nations will suffer market 
share losses while developing nations would find 
their exponential growth curbed by China’s influ-
ence. Though it is impossible to say whether or not 
China will continue to develop at the same rate, 
the progress it has made since its accession into 
the WTO and the access to new markets has giv-
en them the ability to economically cannibalize 
its neighbors. China’s exports grow at an average 
of 19.7%, compared to 7.1% for other Asian coun-
tries with similar exports and 8.7% for the world’s 
developing economies (Greenaway, 157).
 Not only economically, China is taking 
steps into the legal side of international trade. 
It has become skilled in exploiting the nature of 
the WTO legal body, the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), since its accession in 2001. China has had, 
to date, 23 cases brought up against it in the WTO, 
primarily stemming from the United States and the 
European Union (EU), although usually third par-
ties will join in on the proceedings. 
 At the beginning, China was very naïve. 
The first case brought against China was in 2004; 
it was an accusation by the United States about 
the Value-Added Tax (VAT) on Integrated Circuits. 
China was accused of giving a partial refund to 
Chinese enterprises on integrated circuits, result-
ing in a lower VAT (“China – Value”). The case was 
fairly straightforward; China hastily removed the 
partial refund for enterprises in China. Third parties 
included the EU, Japan, and Mexico. China and 
the US reached an agreement without having to 
request the formation of a panel by the DSB. Yet, 
after its five-year phase-in period, China began 
to utilize the knowledge it had gained sitting in as 
a third party on various negotiations. In 2006 Can-
ada, the US, and the EU brought an accusation 
against China concerning the imports of automo-
bile parts because China was increasing the tariff 
on auto parts “from 10% to 25%, the same as the 
rate charge on imported foreign-made vehicles, 
if the parts comprise more than 60%” of the auto-
mobile (Zhang, 6).  Instead of cooperating with 
the complainants, in this case China allowed pro-
ceedings to be carried out to their full term, and 
due to a lack of retrospective compensation, Chi-
na did not have to compensate for “any damag-
es made during the litigation process at the WTO, 
which can easily take two years” (Zhang, 14). Fol-
lowing the panel ruling, China even went so far 
as to appeal the decision, causing another two 
months of discussion and prolonging their practic-
es (“China – Measures Affecting Imports”). Similar 
tactics were taken by China in cases such as the 
case for intellectual property rights in China and 
the case regarding procedures that affect trad-
ing rights and distribution services for products of 
an audiovisual nature (“China – Audiovisual Enter-
tainment Products,” “China – Intellectual Property 
Rights”).
 The most recent case brought up against 
China involves electronic payment services. For-
eign suppliers are forced to go through a Chinese 
entity for electronic payment services, which 
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causes those suppliers to use the undervalued 
Yuan instead of their domestic currency (“China 
– Certain”).  There are also inconsistencies re-
garding payment methods for other members 
of the WTO because access is guaranteed to all 
merchants that use the Chinese entity, while oth-
ers are forced to negotiate for access. The main 
complainant is the United States, with third parties 
including Australia, Ecuador, the EU, Guatemala, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea. It is important 
to note that of the third parties involved, five of 
them are major players in world trade, indicating 
that this issue holds serious weight for a large por-
tion of the economic world. This issue has yet to 
be fully resolved, yet the request for consultations 
was made on September 15, 2010, with a panel 
yet to be formed (“China – Certain”). Due to the 
procedures of the WTO and the complexity of the 
case, it is doubtful that it will be resolved in the 
near future. In fact, it is most likely that it will be 
drawn out like previous cases, which could have 
a severe impact on the world economy. This is 
just one example from the recent history of cases 
brought up against China that have yet to be ex-
plored or even discussed. In the meantime, China 
remains free to continue its practices unregulat-
ed. It should be noted that if China had not joined 
the WTO, other countries would have been able 
to legitimately punish China with tariffs and other 
trade barriers, forcing China to follow the general 
rules of the market. Its WTO membership definitely 
provides an edge for its legal maneuvering. 
 Not only has China learned how to use the 
WTO system to its advantage, there is ample data 
from the 1990s that shows they have been grow-
ing significantly without the WTO, and by joining 
the WTO China now faces more red tape, as do 
its trading partners (Greenaway 152). While this is 
not a point often thought about, it is something 
worth considering when taking into accounts the 
risks and benefits of China in the WTO.
 It is difficult to discern whether the nega-
tive changes brought by and upon China would 
have still occurred had it not joined the WTO, but 
certain elements of the WTO have a clear correla-
tion with effects in the world. Due to its accession, 
China was able to shift towards a more industrial 
style of economy, which has had a distinct effect 
on the environment of China, particularly in the 
water supply. While wage disparity could have 
occurred regardless of whether or not China 
joined the WTO, the influx of manufacturing work 
surely influenced the widening gap between the 
urban and rural communities. Other Asian coun-
tries have experienced a decrease in exports due 
to China’s rapidly expanding export sector. Before 
China joined the WTO, the various agreements it 
had with other nations would be enforced on that 
nation’s terms. Now given that China is a part of 
the WTO, other nations are forced to work through 
the laws of the system, a system that China is very 
adept at manipulating. Overall, while there are 
numerous positive effects of China’s accession, 
the risks outweigh the benefits in this case.
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